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FACTS 
On January 1, 1920, the Riverside & Dan River Cotton 
Mills, a textile corporation of Danville, !Virginia, obtained 
from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company a group life 
insurance policy, the purpose and object of which was to in-
sure, without medical examination or other conditions, all of 
the employees of the Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, In-
corporated. The policy was to remain in force and effect for 
one year, but was subject to renewal at the end of each year."' 
The mills were to pay an initial monthly premium of 
$3,823.83, which would be the monthly premium for 4,375 
lives, the initial number insured. Thereafter the mills filed 
with the insurance company lists of its employees, and regu-
lar premiums were paid by the mills based upon the amount 
of the insurance in force, and of course the number of em-
ployees insured. It is important to note that no person was 
insured until he had been in the employ of the mills for three 
months, later changed to one year, and what is still more im-
portant, that if the employee was insured under this group 
policy, if he left the employment of the mills, on the 21st of 
the month following his leaving, the mill would notify the 
insurance company and the premium would be adjusted ac-
cordingly, and no further premium paid on account of that 
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former employee. The group policy was delivered to the 
mills, and in carrying out the insurance plan, a certificate 
was delivered to each employee who qualified by length of 
employment; each certificate referring to and incorporating 
a number of the provisions of the group policy .. The entire 
cost was paid by the mills, and no employee paid any amount 
directly or indirectly. 
A copy of the certificate is found with the typewritten 
record, plaintiff's exhibit No. 2~ page 112. A copy of the 
group policy is found, plaintiff's exhibit No. 1, with the type-
written record, page 101. 
When Pleny S. Collins qualified for one of these certifi-
cates, same was issued to him under date of January 3, 1929. 
The certificate named Amanda I. Collins, the plaintiff in this 
action,· as beneficiary, and provided for the payment to her, 
upon the death of Collins, while in the employ· of the mills, 
of the value of the certificate. Collins continued to work 
for the mill from the date of his employment up to June 20, 
1930,-see records Miss Mary Bowen, page 86. When Col-
lins ceased to be employed by the company, in due ~ourse 
the mills notified the insurance company, and no further 
premiums were paid on account of any insurance on the life 
of Collins. 
The entire insurance contract as to all employees was 
duly cancelled by agreement between the mills and the in-
surance company as of August 31, 1930. 
Pleny S. Collins died on the 23rd of August, 1932,-Mrs. 
Collins, pages 63-66. No sort of notice or claim was ever as-
serted until June 9, 1931, nor was any notice sent to the in-
surance company. No payment was made on account of this 
claim. It claimed a disability. On August 30, 1932, notice 
was sent of the death of Collins, and claim was made for the 
amount of life insurance. The whole theory of plaintiff's 
case was that her husband, liaving become totally and per-
manently disabled while in the employ of the mills, that his 
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certificate was continued in effect up until the time of his 
death, altho no premiums were paid, no notice given to the 
Metropolitan, and altho the basic group policy had been can-
celled in its entirety nearly a year before the first notice of 
disability was asserted. 
PLAINTIFF'S THEORY 
The plaintiff, in her notice of motion, apparently pro-
ceeds under the theory that she is seeking to recover an 
amount upon tke death of the insured. 
The complete answer to that theory is the wording of the 
policy, and the certificate sued on. 
"IF DEATH OCCUR WHILE THE EMPLOYEE IS IN 
THE E:MPLOY OF THE EMPLOYER, THE AMOUNT OF 
INSURANCE IN FORCE ON SAID EMPLOYEE, IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH GROUP POLICY AS ABOVE, WILL 
BE PAID TO AMANDA COLLINS, BENEFICIARY." 
From this, it will be seen, in no event, and under no cir-
cumstances, was any insurance payable for the death of the 
employee, unless the employee was at the time of his death~ 
in the employ of the Cotton Mills. 
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, she is entitled 
to recover only under the provision of Clause 7, of the Group 
Policy. 
Particular attention of the Court is called to the fact that, 
therefore, we are trying to determine whether or not a dis-
ability benefit can be recovered, and not whether there was a 
Life Insurance policy iri force at the time of the insured's 
death. 
A careful consideration of this Group Policy, and this 
whole plan of insurance, will convince anyone that its pur-
pose was to insure only employees. Primarily it was life in-
surance policy to insure the employee's life while in the em-
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ploy of the Company, and in addition thereto, and without 
further cost, the Metropolitan Company included clause 7. 
The material parts of that Clause are as follows: 
"7. TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY BEN-
EFITS. 
ON RECEIPT by the COMPANY AT ITS HOME OF-
FICE OF DUE PROOF that ANY EMPLOYEE INSURED 
hereunder has become wholly and permanently disabled by 
accidental injury or disease, before attaining the age of sixty 
years, so that he is and will be permanently, continuously 
and wholly prevented thereby FROM PERFORMING ANY 
WORK FOR COMPENSATION OR PROFIT, the Company 
will waive the payment of each premium applicable to the 
insurance on the life of such disabled employee that may be-
come payable thereafter under this policy during such dis-
ability, and, in addition to such waiver, will pay to such em-
ployee during such disability, in full settlement of all obliga-
tions hereunder pertaining to such employee, and in lieu of 
the payment of insurance as herein provided, SUCH 
MONTHLY OR YEARLY INSTALLMENTS AS MAY BE 
SELECTED BY SUCH EMPLOYEE BY WRITTEN NO~ 
TICE OF THE COMPANY AT ITS HOME OFFICE ON 
THE FOLLOWING BASIS: 
First installment to be paid six months after receipt of 
due proof of total and permanent disability. If the Employee 
dies during the period of total permanent disability, any 
installment remaining unpaid shall be payable as they be-
come due to the beneficiary nominated by such Employee, 
and such beneficiary shall have the right to commute such 
remaining payments into one sum on the basis of interest 
compounded at the rate of three and one-half per centum 
per annum. THIS PROVISION IS GRANTED WITHOUT 
ADDITIONAL COST TO THE EMPLOYER. 
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT PROOF OF TOTAL AND 
PERMANENT DISABILITY MAY HAVE BEEN ACCEPT-
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ED BY THE COMPANY AS SATISFACTORY, the Em-
ployee shall, at any time on demand from the Company, 
furnish due proof of the continuance of such disability, and, 
in case of his failure so to do, the said Employee shall be 
deemed to have recovered from such state of disability. In 
the event that the said Employee recovers from such state 
of disability before all the installments hereinbefore men-
tioned have been paid, or fails on demand to furnish due 
proof of the continuance of such disability, all further 
waiver of premiums and payment of installments on account 
of such Employee shall cease. Insurance on .the life of such · 
Employee shall be revived, but be limited in amount of the 
commuted value, on said interest basis, of the installments 
remaining unpaid on account of such Employee at the time 
of such recovery." 
It is, we think, certain that the purport and intention of 
this clause was to substitute these disability payments for 
earnings provided the employee was permanently disabled 
while an employee, and while the policy was in force, if 
thereafter he was unable by reason of this condition, not 
to perform a work he had been performing, but in the lan-
guage of the policy, to perform any work for compensation 
or profit. 
While counsel for the defendant in error does not desire 
to burden the Court with the citation of unnecessary decis-
ions, and have endeavored to confine this brief to what they 
deem most pertinent decisions, believing as they do, that 
this case is fully controlled by the decisions of this Honor-
able Court, it may be of interest to observe that the Su-
preme Court of the State of Washington, by a recent decis-
ion, January 3, 1934, went even further than this Court in 
sustaining the position of the defendant. 
In Reynolds v. Travellers Ins. Co.,-- Pacific--, the 
Court said: 
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"The general rule is firmly established that insanity or 
incapacitating sickness of the insured, because of which he 
fails to pay, when due, a premium or assessment on an in-
surance policy, will not excuse such failure so as to prevent 
a forfeiture, termination or suspension of the rights of the 
insured, in case where the policy provides for such forfeiture 
in the event of non-payment of premium." Many cases cit-
ed. 
"While, upon first thought, this :rule may be considered 
harsh, it has very substantial reason to support it. Prompt 
payment of premiums is of the very essence and substance 
of the contract, against which the Courts may not grant re-
lief. While sickness or insanity of the insured may render 
it impossible for him to pay the premium, it does not render 
payment wholly impossible, because it may be paid by oth-
ers for him. Sickness or insanity of the insured is not con-
sidered to be such an act of God as will excuse failure to 
make prompt payment of prem·iums. 
"Now, if insanity does not excuse the failure to pay 
premiums, then there can be no good reason why it should 
excuse the failure to furnish proof of disability. It is the 
proof of disability that excuses the failure to pay the pre-
miums. The very purpose of disability insurance is to pro-
vide an income during such disability, not to accumulate a 
fund for the benefit of a third party beneficiary. Such dis-
ability include$ insanity and other forms of mental incom-
petency. Hence, when the insured takes out such insurance, 
he is called upon to make provision, as he easily may and us-
ually does, for a contingency that may render him unable, 
personally, to make proof. There are very potent reasons 
why this should be the rule. If the time for making proof 
be not confined to the period during which the policy is in 
force, then the beneficiary m-ay wait until the insured has 
died and afterwards claim that the disability took place 
years before. The insurer would thus be put in a position 
where it would be almost impossible to make an investiga-
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tion of the true facts of the situation. The practical effect 
would be that an insurance company would be compelled to 
carry every lapsed or forfeited policy as a contingent liabili-
ty until after the death of the i.nsured. All acturial compu-
tations would thus be upset, and the amount of proper re-
serves could never be determined. We, therefore, must hold 
that the incapacity of the insured furnished no excuse for 
the failure to make due proof during the time that the policy 
was kept in force by the payment of premiums.'' (Italics 
ours). 
In McGifford vs. Protective Life Ins. Co. (Ala. Oct. 26, 
1933), 151 So., page 349, the Alabama Court followed this 
reasoning and said, at page 352: 
"It is clear also, to our m-inds, that to be entitled to the 
total and permanent disability benefits, provided in the in-
surance contract, the claimant must be a member at the 
time he submits his proof of disability, and the insurance 
must be in forc.e, as to such insured, at the time of the 
aproval by the company of the submitted . proofs. We 
discern no ambiguity or doubtful meaning, whatever in 
the contract on this point. It§l provisions are clear 
and to give the contract the meaning insisted upon by ap-
pellant would, in our judgment, make a new contract for 
the parties. This we are not warranted in doing under the 
guise of 'constructions'." 
Goldman vs. New York Life (March 26, 1934), (N.J.) 
171 Atl. 541, is to the same effect. 
It is interesting to note what Collins was doing during 
the period of time that he was not employed by the mill, up 
until the time of his death. It appears from the testimony 
of the plaintiff herself, beginning on page 60, that he stayed 
in the hospital beginning about the 2d of July, for 12 or 
14 days; that thereafter he was at home, was up and around, 
though sick; that subsequently she sent him to Tennessee 
for a vacation; he stayed in Tennessee abolif 6 weeks; that 
.----- ---~--- ----~~-~--------- --~----~-· -~--~ 
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he wrote to her from time to time while he was in Tennes-
see; that when he returned there was a strike going on at 
the Riverside Mills; that subsequently he signed a blank 
claiming. his disability, but there is no excuse, nor attempt 
to excuse the failure to give the insurance company reason-
able notice of the alleged disability for nearly a year after 
the policy had been cancelled. The defendant contends 
first that the said Pleny S. Collins was not permanently and 
totally disabled while in the employ of the company. There 
was no satisfactory medical evidence that he was. On the 
other hand, Dr. J. A. Hawkins, a physician, testified, pages 
92-93: 
"A. I tried to find out from him what was the basis of 
his claim for disability, and he told me that he had some 
trouble with his hands and his feet, and I examined him 
and I couldn't find any evidence of anything at all on his 
hands to show any reason why he couldn't work. The 
palms of his hands were calloused, looked like he had been 
working right recently, had all the marks of work. 
"Q. Did you find any evidence, examine him for any 
evidence of pellagra? 
"A. Yes, sir, I couldn't find any evidences of it at all. 
"Q. I believe you reported to the company at that time 
that he was not disabled? 
Mr. Stiers: Objection to report to the company. 
"Q. What was your opinion then as to whether he was 
disabled? 
"A. No, sir, I don't think: he was disabled in June, 1931. 
"Q. You don't think he was disabled? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. What did Mr. Collins have to say to you on the 
subject of his disablement? 
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Objection by counsel for plaintiff. 
Overruled. 
Exception. 
"A. What is the question? 
"Q. What did Mr. Collins have to say in reference to 
his claim for disablement, or whatever he had to say to you 
in the course of that examination. 
"A. Well, Mr. Collins told me he was operated on in 
July, 1930, for hemorrhoids and hernia. After he left the 
hospital he went to the home of some of his people out in 
southwest Virginia and didn't see his doctor again until the 
·spring of 1931. According to Mr. Collins' statement to me, 
the next time Dr. Sager saw him after he operated on 
him--
Objection by counsel for plaintiff. 
· Overruled. 
Exception. 
"A. Mr. Collins stated that after Dr. Sager operated 
on him in July, 1930, that he didn't see Dr. Sager any more 
until the spring of 1931, when he examined him for the 
purpose of filling out a report about his disability." 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant contends that· the giving of the notice of 
the alleged disability, which must have occurred while the 
employee was in the employ of the Company, and must have 
been permanent and total, and such as would prevent the 
performance of ANY work for profit, must of necessity be a 
condition precedent to any claim for disability benefits un-
cler this policy. 
Payment nf premiums or waiver of payment was a neces-
Ftary condition to keep the certificate of Collins in force. It 
is not contended that the premium was paid. 
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Payment was not waived until due pro_of of disability was 
received at the Home Office. 
The policy sued upon stated this clearly, it reads as al-
leged in the notice, 
"ON RECEIPT BY THE COMPANY THAT ANY EM-
PLOYEE*** THE COMPANY WILL WAIVE THE PAY-
MENT OF EACH PREMIUM." 
We submit that a substantial compliance therewith is a 
condition precedent to recovery, unless a reasonable excuse 
for the failure to file due proof is alleged and proven, and 
that the plaintiff is required to prove that such proof was 
filed or to excuse the failure. 
Swann vs. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156 Va. 852, is author-
ity for the proposition above stated. 
In that case the question involved was whether or not 
premiums were waived because of the total disability of the 
insured when the insured had furnished no proof but was 
physically unable to furnish same by reason of his disability. 
The Court held that the insured was entitled to the 
waiver of premiums if his failure to furnish the proofs re-
quired by the policy was caused by his physical inability to 
do so. 
Beginning on page 852, 156 Va., the Court stated the 
question in the Swann case as follows: 
"The plaintiff contends that the waiver of premium 
clause in the policy became effective immediately when the 
insured became totally and permanently disabled. The de-
fendant contends that the said clause only becomes effective 
after satisfactory proof of such disability is furnished the 
insurance company, and it has endorsed such waiver of pre-
miums on the policy, and that the furnishing of such proof 
is a condition precedent to be performed before the insured 
is entitled to a waiver of premiums. 
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There is respectable authority in other jurisdictions sup-
porting the contentions of both the plaintiff and the defend-
ant. It is i.n hopeless conflict and the cases cannot be recon-
ciled. There is no Virginia authority on the particular ques-
tion here involved. 
The defendant cites the Alabama case of New England 
Mutual vs. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 807, 116 So. 151, 59 A. L. R. 
1075, as authority in support of its contention, and it must 
be admitted that this case is directly in point and supports 
the construction contended for by the defendant. It cannot 
be distinguished from the present case. It holds under a 
similar clause that the furnishing of proof of disability to 
the insurance company is made a condition precedent to the 
waiver of premium payments under the supplement agree-
ment; that the furnishing of such proof is the specific con-
dition upon which the company will-waive the premiums and 
that the clause is not self-operating. 
That is a leading case in support of the defendant's posi-
tion. In that case the insured became insane prior to the 
due date of the premium·, which was not paid. He continued 
insane until his death, which occurred after the lapse of the 
policy. No proof of disability was furnished the company 
prior to his death. The beneficiary sought to recover on the 
grounds that the insured was mentally and physically unable 
to furnish any proofs of disability and, therefore, was re-
lieved of the consequences of his failure to file same, and 
that the premiums falling due after the beginning of his 
disability should have been waived and the policy kept in 
force. 
A number of cases are collected in notes in 29 A. L. R., 
p. 1511, 54 A. L. R., p. 611, and 59 A. L. R., p. 1080. 
And on page 862, the Court concludes-
"Payment of the premium, when due, has been strictly 
enforced in favor of the insurance companies. This is because 
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the premium is the basis of the contract, and the companies. 
cannot carry on their business unless the premiums are paid. 
Furnishing proofs of total and permanent disability is a dif-
ferent matter. When the disability of the insured occurred 
while the policy was in force, he was entitled to have his 
premiums waived until his death, for his disability continued 
until his death. He had paid for his right, and to say that he 
should lose the benefit of his policy because he failed, 
through mental or physical incapacity, to present proofs 
would be harsh and unreasonable under the circumstances. 
We conclude that the giving of notice and proof of dis-
ability was not a condition precedent to the right to a waiver 
of premiums where the insured, through no fault of his own, 
has become, while the policy is in force, mentaly and physi-
cally incapable of giving the notice or furnishing the proofs 
to the company, and that the issue raised by the replication 
of the plaintiff should have been submitted to a jury." 
After the above mentioned Swann case was decided it 
came back before this court March 16, 1933, 160 Va. 125, and 
in the opinion by Chief Justice Cam·pbell it was stated, at 
page 128: 
" ( 1) Relying ·upon the former opinion, plaintiff con-
tends that the failure to furnish proof of insured's disability 
should not bar a recovery, for the reason that insured was 
incapable of engaging in any gainful occupation, and that 
the giving of notice and proof of disability was not a condi-
tion precedent to the right to a waiver of premiums. Fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion, plaintiff's argument would 
lead to the result that total and permanent disability which 
would prevent insured from engaging in any gainful occu-
pation is equivalent to the insured's being mentally and phy-
sically incapable of furnishing proof or giving notice. 
"(2) The contention rests upon a misconception of the 
opinion. The court did hold: 'That the giving of notice and 
proof of disability was not a condition precedent to the right 
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to a waiver of premiums where the insured, through no fault 
of his own, has become, while the policy is in force, mentally 
and physically incapable of giving the notice or furnishing 
the proofs to the company, * * * .' 
"The effect of that holding, however~ was not to elimi-
nate from the contract all provisions relative to the giving of 
notice or the furnishing of proof of the disability. The 
Court was not dealing with such a disability as prevented 
the insured from engaging in a gainful occupation, but was 
dealing with the issue raised by plaintiff's replication that 
the insured was 'm-entally and physically incapable of fur-
nishing proofs'." 
. Subsequently this Court aecided Atlantic Life Insurance 
Company v. Fugate, September 21, 1933, ( 170 S. E. 573), 
and in the opinion by Justice Hudgins both of the Swann 
cases were refer1·ed to and approved, and the opinion points 
out that the insertion of the word "reasonably'' in an instruc-
tion in the second case was error, and that the burden of 
pro~f rested upon the plaintiff to show: "To be relieved of 
the necessity of giving notice or furnishing proof, the in-
sured must be totally (either physically or mentally) in-
capacitated from acting in the matter." 
In the case at bar there was no attempt to explain or ex-
cuse the failure to furnish to the Company at its home office, 
due proof of the alleged disability. 
In 29 C. M., p. 282, Sec. 8, dealing with health insurance, 
the following is said: 
"The policy generally provides that insured shall notify 
the insurer of his sickness or disability within a time pre-
scribed; and this requirement must be complied with, if rea-
sonable, unless circumstances excuse non-compliance, or un-
less insurer waives compliance." 
Great numbers of cases are cited in support of this state-
ment in the text. 
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On the subject of insurance generally, in 22 C. J ., p. 7, 
Sec. 650, the following is stated: 
"In the absence of any statute or stipulation of the policy 
requiring it, insured or claim·ant under the policy is not re-
quired to give the company notice or proofs of loss. How-
ever, it is a usual requirement of the policy that insured 
or claimant under the policy give notice and furnish proofs 
of loss, and compliance therewith is necessary to enable him 
to recover on the policy, unless the company has waived the 
condition or become estopped to assert it, or unless the cir-
cumstances are such as to excuse non-compliance therewith." 
Here also many cases are cited to sustain the text. 
In Blackman vs. U. S. Cas. Co. (Tenn.), 103 S. W. 784, 
the policy required notice of the disease within ten days. 
There was involved (p. 786) "the question whether the giv-
ing of the notice was a condition precedent to the right of 
recovery depends upon whether a forfeiture clause was at-
tacked (evidently means attached) for failure to give it." In 
discussing the question, the Court called attention to the fact 
that the insured, as in the case at bar, was insured subject 
to the provisions, conditions and definitions and limits set 
out in the policy. It then referred to requirements of notice 
within ten days after contraction of the disease and the pro-
vision that "failure of the insured to comply with any pro-
visions or condition herein shall forfeit all rights to indem-
nity." 
The Court then said: 
"We think the last clause quoted refers to and embraces 
within its terms the provision in respect of notice. The no-
tice clause is either a provision or a condition. The word 
'provision,' of course, indicates nothing technical, but is a 
general term, which may include either a promise or under-
taking of some kind of a condition. We are of the opinion 
that the notice clause expresses a condition precedent to the 
right of recovery. It.has been so construed in many cases. 
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In Cooley's briefs on the Law of Insurance, Vol. 4, Sec. 3457, 
it is said: 'A condition on a policy that, if notice and proofs 
of the death or injury are not furnished within a specific 
time, all claims therefor shall be forfeited to the Company, 
has frequently been held to render the production of such 
notice and proofs within the specific time a condition prece-
dent to any recovery by insured'-citing other cases." 
In Williams vs. U. S. Cas. Co. (N. C.), 64 S. E. 510, the 
policy provided for ten days' notice. Plaintiff in that case 
did not give the notice until fifty days after he became ill. 
The Court said: 
"This provision was doubtless intended to prevent im-
position. But, at any rate, the plaintiff accepted the policy 
with that provision, and he is bound by the Contract. He 
did not comply with the conditions wihch would entitle him 
to recover and His Honor properly field that he could not 
recover." 
In Woodall vs. F. & C. Co. (Ga.), 62 S. E. 808, the plain-
tiff alleged that a notice had been given sometime after the 
expiration of the period required in the policy, but did not 
allege any excuse for the failure to give the notice within 
the required time. The Court sustained a demurrer and its 
action was upheld by the Supreme Court. 
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. vs. Johnson (C. C. A., 3d 
Circuit, 24 7 Fed. 65, is in point. 
There the policy required the notice within twenty-one 
days, and the Court held that the plaintiff had the burden 
of proving compliance with the provision or showing an ex-
cuse for failure to give notice within the time limit. 
The Court said: 
"The time within which such notice should be given was 
indicate in the policy and was agreed by the insured. The 
giving of notice within the time stipulated therefore became 
16 
an undertaking on the part of the insured, the performance 
of which is regarded by the law as an absolute condition 
precedent to the enforcement of the insured's liability." 
Hatch vs. U. S. Cas. Co. (Mass.), 83 N. E. 398. 
The policy involved in this case also required a notice 
within ten days of the time of the accident. The accident 
happened on July 7th and the insured died on August 11th. 
Before his death, the plaintiff did not know the policy was 
in existence, but discovered it and gave notice fo the insurer 
within four days after the death of the insured. The Court 
said: 
"It is to be premised that the giving of this notice is not 
a condition subsequent, as it has sometimes been called. It 
is not simply a part of the rule of procedure for the enforce-
ment of the liability of the defendant, as are the provisions 
of the fifth paragraph in this same policy providing for 
proofs of loss. The promise to insure is not absolute but 
conditional. The condition is that the notice, whatever it 
may be and by whomsoever or whenever given shall be 
given. It is a condition precedent to the creation of liability 
of the life of the premise; or, to put it perhaps in a better 
way, the giving of the notice is one of the essentials of the 
cause of the action." 
See North American National Ins. Co. vs. Rowell (Tex.), 
175 S. W. 170, and Queen of Arkansas Ins. Co .. vs. Laster 
(Ark.), 156 S. W. 484. 
The case last mentioned involved a policy of fire insur-
ance, but the principle with reference to requirement of giv-
ing notice is the same, regardless of the nature of the insur-
ance. 
The reason for notice in the case of fire insurance, is to 
give the insurance company an opportunity to investigate 
the origin of the fire, value of the property destroyed, and 
generally to protect its interests. 
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The reason for the rule of giving notice within a reason-
able time in cases of disability insurance is the same. 
The insurance company is entitled 1 to an opportunity to 
investigate to ascertain whether or not the alleged disability 
occurred while the insured was in the employ of the Com-
pany, and find out for its own protection and for the pro-
tection of the public generally, the extent of the disability, 
and likelihood of its continuing. 
It is true .that in a number of these cases the policy pro-
vides a specific period of time in which notice should be 
given and proof filed. 
The defendant contends that the fair interpretation of 
the Group policy in this easel is that the plaintiff would be 
required to affirmatively show that the due proof was fur-
nished within a reasonable time after the employee ceased 
to work for the Mills, or that the failure to furnish the proof 
should be excused, and the burden was likewise upon the 
plaintiff to furnish evidence excusing the failure to file. 
In the Swann case, supra, the provision of the policy 
requiring the furnishing of proof of disability, .did not re-
quire the proof to be furnished at any particular time. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a recent opin-
ion, June 28, 1923, has considered this question, Ammons vs. 
Equitable Life, 169 S. E. 807 (N.C.) 
In that case the Disability Clause of the Policy required 
notice to be given for the premiums to be waived. There 
the plaintiff held a certificate, under a Group Policy, in 
many respects similar to the one in the case at bar. 
The plaintiff claimed that he became disabled on March 
1, 1931. On June 18, 1932, he sent to the Company a proof 
signed by a physician, but that physician stated that he was 
not then permanently disabled. Subsequently the plaintiff 
testified that he notified the Paymaster of his Employer, 
who handled insurance claims. 
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina, affirming the 
judgment of the lower Court, stated: 
"The burden of proof was upon the plaintiff, and as we 
interpret the record, there was no evidence that due proof 
of total disability has ever been furnished by the plaintiff 
to the defendant insurance company. Therefore the ruling 
of the trial judge was correct." 
In view of these positive, direct and affirmative state-
ments in the cases cited, we contend that the burden was on 
the plaintiff to bring herself within the terms of the policy, 
and to show that all the conditions essential to the creation 
of liability were complied with and that in the total absence 
of any evidence of any notice whatsoever or of any excuse 
for not filing due proof, there was no waiver of premiums, 
and the policy was not in force as to Collins. 
EVEN IF DUE PROOF NOT REQUIRED, THE EVI-
DENCE CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS ABLE TO PERFORM "ANY WORK FOR PROFIT." 
It is submitted that this language is plain and unam-
biguous. 
ANY WORK FOR PROFIT means just exactly what it 
says. 
Webster defines the adverb, "ANY" to be--
uTo any extent; in any degree; at all." 
To revise this language, is to rewrite the contract of the 
parties. This the Court should not do. 
In Orr vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 Fed. (2nd) 901, 
Judge Otis said at page 903 : 
"Courts do not make contracts. Parties to contracts 
make them and are bound by them; even by provisions in 
them which are harsh. Courts must enforce even harsh 
provisions if there is no doubt as to their meaning. Where 
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there are two possible meanings, Courts may, in certain 
situations, adopt one or the other of those meanings. But 
the meaning that is adopted must be in the contact." 
COURT SHOULD NOT MAKE NEW CONTRACT 
FOR PARTIES 
This Court, in September, 1931, reiterated the following 
elementary principles of law in regard to Insurance con-
tracts: 
An ambiguous insurance policy is to be strictly con-
strued against the insurance company, but it, like other 
contracts, must be construed in accordance with its terms. 
Words should receive the construction which they com-
monly receive in the ordinary affairs of life. 
"The province of construction lies wholly within the do-
main of ambiguity." 
There is nothing to construe in a provision too plain to 
be misunderstood. 
A court should not make uncertain that which is certain. 
If the terms are clear and unambiguous, they are to be 
taken in their ordinary and popular sense. 
Kennard vs. Travelers Protective Association of Ameri-
ca, 157 Va. 153, 157, 160 S. E. 38, 39. 
In the foregoing case it was also said : 
"It is likewise universally conceded that Courts cannot 
make contracts for people and must construe them as writ-
ten when they are plain upon their face, and this notwith-
standing the equally well-established rule that they are to 
be, in doubtful cases, construed liberally in favor of the 
assured." 
157 V.a. 166, 160 S. E. 42. 
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In Indemnity Insurance Company vs. Jordan (Va.), 164 
S. E. 539, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia again 
recognized the rule that an unambiguous policy cannot be 
extended by judicial construction so as to afford protection 
not included within the terms of the policy. In concluding 
its opinion the Court said: 
"Our conclusion is that the policy must be construed 
according to its terms. They are plain and clear, and we are 
bound to adhere to them as the only authentic expression of 
the intention of the parties." 
164 S. E. 541. 
Petitioner submits that the words of the provision con-
tained in the policy and certificate defining disability are 
concise and plain and that there is nothing to construe. 
In Lee vs. New York Life Ins. Co., 188 N.C. 538, 125 S. 
E. 168, the Court had for consideration the disability pro-
visions contained in two life insurance policies in which the 
definition was substantially that found in the provisions in-
volved in he case at bar, and: the Court hearing the appeal 
quoted with approval the charge of the trial court, reading 
in part: 
"It does not mean merely that this disability may inca-
pacitate him from working on his farm with his hands, but 
that it must incapacitate him from engaging in any avoca-
tion for remuneration or profit." 
In Buckner vs. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 172 N. 
C. 762, 90S. E. 897, the insured was a fireman who had lost 
a hand. The court said, at page 762: 
"But the evidence fails to disclose a total disability that 
will 'permanently, continuously and wholly' incapacitate 
plaintiff 'from pursuing any and all gainful occupations.' 
The authorities are practically unanimous that under the 
terms of this policy plaintiff cannot recover without show-
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ing a bodily injury that will incapacitate him not only from 
following his usual avocation of fireman, but also from pur-
suing any other gainful occupation. The language is too 
plain and the meaning too unmistakable to permit an en-
largement of the terms of the contract by construction. It 
is unfortunate for the plaintiff, but 'it is so nominated in 
the bond'." (Italics ours.) 
In Bullock vs. Mutual Ins. Co., 200 N. C. 642, the policy 
definition was such impairment of mind and body should 
continuously render it impossible "for the insured to follow 
a gainful occupation." The Court held that the insured 
must show more than inability to follow his usual avocation 
and must show incapacity to follow any calling for which he 
was physically and mentally qualified. By that, ability to 
do odd jobs of comparatively trivial nature would not pre-
clude recovery. 
In Holcomb vs. Grand Lodge B. R. T., 171 Ky. 843, the 
plaintiff was a flagman who had lost the use of an eye. 
The Court said, at page 846: 
"The Policy in this case clearly was not an insurance 
against such total disability as might prevent appellant from 
following his vocation as flagman, but was against such total 
disability, in a broader and more comprehensive sense, 
which 'might prevent him from following that or any other 
vocation. The language is clear, explicit and unambiguous; 
* * * " 
In Fragerlic vs. New York Life Ins. Co., 278 Pacific 104 
(Oregon), the policy defined total disability as such that 
prevented the insured "from engaging in any occupation 
whatsover for remuneration or profit." The Court held 
that the proper test was whether the insured could do suffi-
cient work so that he might engage in some occupation for 
profit. 
22 
In Hurley vs. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 199 N. W. 343, the 
Court said: 
"We meet at once the question in the case as to whether 
or not appellant became 'totally permanently and incurable 
disabled' and is 'thereby prevented permanently, continu-
ously and wholly from performing any work or following 
any occupation for compensation or profit'. Many cases 
have been before the courts involving construction of con-
tracts of the character, which, however, are not always 
identical in phraseology. The cases fall quite readily in two 
general classes : Those wherein the policy provides for in-
demnity if the insured is disabled from transacting the du-
ties pertaining to the occupation in which he is then en-
gaged, and those wherein the policy provides for indemnity 
if the insured is disabled from performing any work or fol-
lowing any occupation. This case belongs to the latter 
class." 
In Lyon vs. The Railway Passenger Ass. Co., 46 Ia. 631, 
the Court said : 
"The language of the parties is plain, unambiguous and 
needs no construction. It provides that the defendant shall 
be liable for loss occasioned by being totally disabled from 
all kinds of business. Effect should be given to this lan-
guage. It should be understood to mean what it says. It 
cannot be claimed that it means that defenaant will indem-
nify on account of loss sustained by being partially disabled 
from some kind of business." 
North Carolina just recently, April 19, 1933, in the case 
of Thigpen vs. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., reported 
in Vol. 168, S. E. advance issue of May 11, 1933, at page 
845, in a strong and well-reasoned opinion, has taken the 
same view that we believe to prevail in Virginia. 
In the Thigpen case, there was a policy: containing sub-
stantiaTiy the same language as the policy at bar. On page 
847, the Court said: 
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"The interpretation of the meaning of the words in the 
policy or words of like import has produced a wide diver-
gence of opinion among text-writers and courts of last re-
sort. Similar language was construed by the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Company vs. 
McCrary, 161 Tenn. 389, 32 S. W. (2nd) 1052, 1053. The 
Court said : 'The phrase "total disability" has a well under-
stood meaning in the law of insurance. It does not mean a 
state of absolute helplessness. The decisions, almost with-
out conflict, define that condition as an inability to do the 
material acts necessary to the prosecution of insured's bus-
iness or occupation, and substantially all the material acts) 
in (substantially) his usual or customary manner. Cases 
so holding are too numerous to be set out.' 
"See, also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. VB. Lambert, 157 
Miss. 759, 128 So. 750. The logic of these decisions is that 
such contracts undertake to insure the usual and customary 
occupation of the policyholder, or, at least, that the insured· 
shall at all times be reasonably qualified physically and 
mentally to perform the material duties of his present occu-
pation. Courts adopting a different view proceed upon the 
theory that contracts are made by the parties and not by the 
judges, and that if the words creating or eliminating liabil-
ity are clear, plain and unambiguous, the contract must be 
enforced according to its terms. 
"Notwithstanding the views of courts in other jurisdic-
tions or the power and persuasiveness of the reasoning, this 
court has spoken upon this type of contract. Thus, a farmer 
procured a policy, providing disability benefits in language 
practically identical with that contained in the policy now 
under consideration. See Lee VB. Ins. C., 188 N.C. 538, 125 
S. E. 186, 187. The trial judge charged the jury as follows: 
'Now, you will want to know what is meant by the language 
in the contract "wholly incapacitated and thereby perma-
nently and continuously prevented from engaging in any 
avocation whatsoever for remuneration or profit." It does 
I 
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not mean merely that this disability may incapacitate him 
from pursuing his usual avocation, from working on his 
farm with his hands, but that it must incapacitate him from 
engaging in any avocation for remuneration or profit. * * * 
"Our courts hold that the act shall be in force as it reads 
and that the insured cannot recover because totally disabled 
for his own trade or business, if he retain health, strength, 
and physical ability sufficient for the pursuance of other 
avocations by which he might engage for profit or remu-
neration." The Lee case was submitted to the jury, but it 
is to be noted that there was no evidence in the record that 
the insured actually received money for performing the acts 
described in the evidence. 
"Th~ interpretation adopted by this Court is supported 
by the following declaration in 6 Cooley's Briefs on Insur-
ance, p. 5548: The provision may limit total disability to 
the inability to carry on any and all kinds of business. Un-
der such a clause the insured must be unable to perform not 
only the duties of his usual occupation, but the duties of 
any other occupation." 
There is a distinction between : ( 1) an insurance policy 
which provides for the payment of benefits to an insured 
whose disability renders him unable to perform tlie sub-
stantial duties of his usual occupation and (2) an insurance 
policy which provides for payments when the insured is 
prevented by his disability from "and performing any work 
for compensation or profit". We contend that the policy 
involved in the instant case came within the second cate-
gory. 
We also contend that as there is no ambiguity in the 
policy, the case does not come within the domain of judicial 
construction. The language is clear and the terms of the 
policy should be given their ordinary meaning and should 
not be extended by judicial construction. The Court should 
not make a new contract for the parties. 
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( 1) Insured Not Entitled to Recover When Able to En-
gage in Occupation or Perform Work for Profit. 
Although there is a conflict in the decisions, the weight 
of authority supports the defendant's contention that one 
is not entitled to benefits under a policy like the one in-
volved in the instant case when he performs any work for 
wage or profit. The Courts which have tried to give effect 
to the contract of the parties reached the conclusion that in 
order to recover under a policy providing for the payment 
of benefits when the insured is prevented by disability from 
engaging in any occupation and performing any work for 
wage or profit, it is not sufficient to show that the insured 
is unable to follow his usual occupation. If he follows 
any occupation, he cannot recover benefits under such a 
policy. 
"Mr. Joyce says : 
" 'Total disability and similar expressions in accident 
and benefit insurance. In ascertaining the meaning, ref-
erence must be had to the entire contract and the exact 
terms used. · The words may necessitate that the assured 
should be so far disabled as to prevent his following any 
occupation or labor.' Insurance Sec. 3031. * * * ." 
Idem, 898 
The Court continued: 
"Referring to the meaning of the words 'wholly dis-
abled', May on Insurance, Sec. 522, says that- the ability of 
the insured to engage in some business will prevent recov-
ery unless the insured is disqualified to engage in any oc-
cupation. 
"Mr. Beach says, substantially, that 'total disability' 
that would entitle a member of an insurance order to re-
cover must be not only permanent, but total, so as to render 
him unable to perform or direct any: kind of labor or busi-
ness. Ins. Sec. 262. 
./ 
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"Bacon says that 'total disability' naturally means being 
totally disabled· for all kinds of business unless by the con-
tract the disability is to be only from the usual occupation 
of the insured. Benefits Societies, Sec. 395A. 
These authorities, and many others which we could cite. 
establish conclusively that under the terms of the policy is-
in the absence of evidence showing total disability to pursue 
sued by the defendant the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, 
any kind of gainful occupation." 
Idem. 
It will be observed from the foregoing quotation that 
the North Carolina Court took the position that there is a 
distinction between an agreement to pay when the insured 
is disabled sa as to be unable to follow his usual occupation 
and an agreement to pay when he is disabled so as to be 
prevented from pursuing any gainful occupation. The Court 
stated that the language of the policy was too clear and un-
mistakable to permit an enlargement of the terms thereof 
by judicial construction. 
The Court held that as the plaintiff was engaged in a 
gainful occupation, he ·was not disabled within the meaning 
of the policy and that consequently he should not be per-
mitted to recover. 
What was said by the North Carolina Court is equally 
applicable to the instant case. The policy provisions are 
similar in that an insured under either cannot recover upon 
proof which merely shows that he is unable to follow his 
usual occupation. 
The Buckner decision was followed in Lee vs. New York 
Life Insurance Company, 188 N.C. 538, 125 S. E. 186. In 
that case the policy provided that if the insured became 
wholly disabled "so that he is and will be presumably there-
by permanently and continuously prevented from engaging 
in any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or profit", 
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certain benefits would be paid. The trial court had given 
an instruction, which was approved, to the effect that total 
disability under the policy involved in that case did not 
mean such a disaoility as would "incapacitate him from 
pursuing his usual avocation, from working on his farm 
with his hands, but that it must incapacitate him from en-
gaging in any avocation fon remuneration or profit". The 
following instruction was also approved: 
" 'I charge you further if you find the plaintiff was en-
gaged in farming before any disability occurred and had 
ceased to do manual labor, but has since that time, during 
the year 1923, been in active charge of his farm, managing 
the labor, marketing the crops, and otherwise handling the 
same, as is the custom of well-to-do farmers, that he has 
been attending actively the meetings as a director of the 
bank, then I charge you, if you find these facts from the 
evidence, that the plaintiff would not be totally disabled 
for carrying on an avocation for profit or remuneration, 
and you would answer the first issue 'No'. * * * ." 
125 S. E. 188. 
Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, however, on 
the ground that on conflicting evidence the jury had found 
for the plaintiff. 
In Hurley vs. Bankers' Life Company, 198 Iowa 1129, 
199 N. W. 343, the policy provided for certain payments 
when the insured became totally, permanently and incur-
ably disabled so that he is "thereby prevented permanently, 
continuously, and wholly from performing any work or fol-
lowing any occupation for compensation or profit". The 
evidence showed that the insured, an uneducated farmer, 
had sustained an accident resulting in the loss of a leg. He 
was compelled to use crutches and was unable to do any 
effective work on his farm. He could drive a team if har-
nessed and hitched for him by someone else. He could do 
chores on the farm such as a man with one leg could do. 
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The Court held that he was not disabled so as to be entitled 
to recover under the policy and affirmed a directed verdict 
.for the defendant. It took the position tliat in order for 
him to recover, he had to be unable to perform any work or 
follow any occupation for compensation or profit. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company vs. Noe, 161 
Tenn. 335, 31 S. W. (2nd) 689, was an action on a group pol-
icy providing for the payment of benefits in case of total and 
permanent disability wholly incapacitating the employee. 
At 690 the Court said: 
"In insurance parlance the phrase 'totally and perma-
nently disabled' contemplates a physical condition at the 
time of the claim which reasonably convinces the judging 
authorities that (a) the subject is then totally disabled, and 
(b) will so remain for life. * * * The jury or judge may look 
to the physical appearance of the claimant and the history 
of the case, and consider lay and expert testimony and de-
termine whether (a) the disability is total, that is, incapac-
itating the claimant from any remunerative occupation; 
and (b) whether it will be permament, that is, lasting or 
continuous, as distinguished from temporary merely, with 
a promise or affording a probability of recovery." 
In the foregoing case the question involved was whether 
or .not the total disability was "permanent". The Court held 
that there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the 
jury and a judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed as modi-
fied. 
In Ellis vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 214 Ala. 
166, 106, So. 689, the policy provided for the payment of 
benefits when the insured "has become wholly disabled by 
bodily injury or disease so that he is and will be presumably 
thereafter permanently and continuously prevented from 
engaging in any occupation whatsoever for remuneration or 
profit''. The evidence showed that after the issuance of the 
policy the insured was stricken with rheumatism and at 
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times his feet were swollen .so that he was unable to wear 
shoes. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant 
the Court said at 691: 
"We are persuaded the case comes within the influence 
of Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Lasseter, 153 Ala. 630, 45 So. 166, 
15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 252, wherein it was held from· the evi-
dence then offered that paintiff was 'not totally disabled, so 
as to prevent him from engaging in any productive occupa-
tion', and that the affirmative charge was due to be given 
the defendant." 
The following quotation from the Alabama court is par-
ticularly applicable to the instant case: 
"From his own testimony it cannot be said he has been 
permanently and continuously prevented from engaging in 
any occupation whatsoever for ·remuneration or profit dur-
ing the term from February, 1922, to February, 1923. Or-
dinarily, what constitutes 'total disability' is a question of 
fact (Travelers' Ins. Co. vs. Plaster,. supra) ; but where as 
here, the evidence is without conflict, and contrary infer-
ences cannot reasonably be drawn therefrom, the affirma-
tive charge is properly given." 
Idem. 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company vs. Wann (Tex. 
Ct. App.), 28 S. W. (2nd) 196, should be conclusive of the 
matter. In order for the insured to recover, the policy pro-
vided he "must be permanently, continuously, and wholly 
prevented thereby (by reason of his injury) from perform-
ing any work for compensation or profit." The evidence 
showed that the insured, a man 39 years of age, while work-
ing as brakeman, received an injury which rendered his left 
hand useless; that he had been doing railroad work ever 
since he was fourteen years of age, that he knew no other 
work; that he could not get employment as a brakeman or in 
connection with the movement of trains; that he did not try 
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to get employment in any other line; that his wife and fath-
er-in-law purchased a 41-acre farm which they managed; 
that chickens and fruit were raised on the farm; that he 
looked after the employment of laborers during the fruit 
picking season, that he had milked a cow with more or less 
success; that he could do anything that a man with one hand 
could do if he knew how; that he could drive an automobile 
with his right hand; and that if he had a position as sales-
man requiring him to use an automobile and take orders for 
anything that wholesale houses had to sell, he believed he 
could do it. Although the insured was "permanently" dis-
abled, he could not recover benefits under the policy because 
he had not been prevented from performing work for com-
pensation or profit. The decision of the trial Court was re-
versed, therefore, and final judgment was entered for the 
defendant. 
After quoting with approval the statements from Cooley 
and Joyce, which appear in the opinion of the North Caro-
lina ·Court in the Buckner case, supra, page 7, the Texas 
Court said: 
"It will be noticed that the wording of the clause refer-
ring to the disability of the insured is materially different 
in the policy in the cited case and in the policy in the instant 
case. Here the insured 'must be permanently, continuously 
and wholly prevented thereby (by reason of his injury) from 
performing any work for compensation or profit'. In the 
cited case, and in many other insurance cases in Texas, the 
wording of the policy was that the insured 'must be wholly 
disabled and prevented from performing any and every kind 
of duty pertaining·to his occupation'." 
28 S. W. (2nd) 199. 
It is submitted that the foregoing decisions demonstrate 
conclusively that a person is not disabled so as to be entitled 
to benefits under a policy like the one involved in the instant 
case if he is able to engage in any occupation or perform any 
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work for wage or profit. The burden is, of course, on the 
paintiff to show that he has been prevented by his disabiity 
from engaging in any occupation and performing any work 
for wage or profit. 
For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted 
that the judgment of the learned trial Court should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. 
By GRASTY CREWS, 
HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWN, 
Counsel. 
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